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T h e D y n a m i c s o f C r e d i t S p r e a d s i n H o t e l
M o r t g a g e s a n d S i g n a l i n g I m p l i c a t i o n s
A u t h o r s Jan A. deRoos, Crocker H. Liu, Daniel C.
Quan, and Andrey D. Ukhov
A b s t r a c t We use a vector autoregression framework to investigate loan
pricing in a market with short-term leases (hotels) relative to
longer-term leases (office properties), studying how news on the
economy and capital markets are incorporated into the relative
pricing of risk. We examine the impact of economic variables
on the incremental risk premium and establish its informational
content. Relative loan prices reflect systematic risk: an
improvement in the general economy, an increase in forward
looking corporate profitability, an increase in capital availability,
and an increase in industry demand forecast a decline in the risk
premium differential. We then examine how loan pricing adjusts
to expected delinquencies. The spreads themselves contain
important economic information and can help forecast
delinquencies. Lenders are forward-looking in the pricing of risk
and appear to set interest rates in anticipation of future
delinquencies.
We take advantage of a natural laboratory offered by hotel financing to study the
loan pricing in a market with short-term leases (hotels) relative to longer-term
leases (office properties) with respect to how news on the economy, capital, and
real estate markets is incorporated in loan pricing. In obtaining financing for
hotels, the contract interest rate for hotel mortgages substantially exceeds those
reported for other property types. We study whether the difference in loan pricing
associated with different property types (hotels vs. office buildings) is
systematically priced by fundamental factors. The argument that lenders advance
is that underwriting hotel property is a cross between a business loan and a real
estate loan because hotels constantly sell their rooms at the prevailing market rate
(e.g., rooms are essentially marked to market on a daily basis). A question that
thus arises is whether this higher interest rate contains important information
regarding the market conditions. In other words, is it justified and is it informative?
Further, is it possible to identify forward-looking factors of the spread in hotel
interest rates that will allow hotel investors and lenders to take appropriate action
in advance of the rate shift? A related question involves whether real estate lenders
set hotel interest rates based on expected credit risk.1
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Our objective in this paper is to address the informational content of the loan
pricing spread.2 Using spreads at the time of loan origination (SATO) for mortgage
loans by property type from Lehman Brothers (July 1998–January 2008) and
Cushman Wakefield Sonnenblick-Goldman (February 2008–March 2011) we
examine the time series movements in the average spread. Our study spans a
variety of economic conditions including expansions and contractions, which is
important because it allows us to subsume a variety of economic events. As Shiller
and Perron (1985) and Shiller (1989) show, increasing the number of observations
by sampling more frequently while leaving the total time span of the data
unchanged may only minimally increase the power of tests.3
Given the significant time variation in the credit spreads, we explore their
informational content. Prior research on the role of asset prices in signaling future
economic conditions and propagating economic fluctuations has emphasized the
information content of corporate spreads as indicators of default risk and also
future economic activity. For example, Philippon (2009) theoretically shows that
as credit spreads rise, the supply of funds starts to contract, which results in falling
asset prices and consequently an increase in the likelihood of default as the equity
in deals narrows.
While the joint dynamics of prices across real estate markets has been studied
(Oikarinen, Hoesli, and Serrano, 2011; Liow and Newell, 2012; Wiley and
Wyman, 2012),4 the important question of the pricing of risk in real estate markets
characterized by different loan maturities or loan-to-value ratios (LTV) has
received much less attention. We contribute to the literature on this dimension.
We explore the information content embedded in the hotel credit spread including
whether this risk premium is systematically priced by fundamental factors and
additionally if it possesses forecasting ability for future loan performance.5 Thus,
we study the pricing in a market with short-term leases relative to pricing in a
market with longer-term leases. A VAR framework is used that allows for the
mutual impact of inter-dependent economic time series. The literature6 indicates
that higher credit spreads for commercial mortgages (i.e., differences between
mortgage rates and Treasury bond rates with the same maturities) should exist for
more volatile property types and property types with more investment flexibility
(i.e., property that can be expanded or renovated). Similar results should also
obtain if the differential risk premium (i.e., difference in the interest rate on hotels
and office property types) is investigated in lieu of credit spreads using a transitive
logic process.
Our empirical results are consistent with the literature. In particular, hotels have
higher spreads relative to offices since they are not only riskier but also have
greater adjustment costs (investment flexibility given higher and more frequent
capital expenditures for hotels). The relatively short lease maturity associated with
hotels should make them more sensitive to changes in fundamental factors, which
in turn should increase the loan pricing of risk of hotels relative to that of offices.
We find that this is the case with the differential risk premium systematically
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priced. In other words, loan pricing—the spread—reflects systematic risk and the
compensation for systematic risk factors. This is the first distinguishing feature of
our study. Fundamental factors that account for this systematic pricing of the hotel
risk premium differential include general economic conditions, expected corporate
profitability, real estate capital availability, and the demand for hotel services. An
increase in these variables is a bellwether to a decline in the hotel risk premium
differential. We also find that the interest rate spread contains important economic
information for forecasting loan delinquencies.7 An increase in the loan spread
(risk premium differential) has forecasting power for predicting an increase in
loan delinquencies. However, the converse situation does not hold (e.g., the risk
premium differential does not increase in response to a shock in delinquencies).
In addition to our main finding that the risk premium can be used to predict loan
delinquencies, we also identify a parsimonious set of economic variables that has
predictive power for delinquencies. We find that an increase in the risk differential
(measured as the difference in standard deviation of returns on hotels and office
properties) forecasts an increase in delinquencies. A positive shock to expected
earnings forecasts, indicating higher expected future predictability, forecasts a
decrease in delinquencies, albeit after a longer lag. Finally, an increase in
unemployment, a variable that captures economic conditions, forecasts an increase
in delinquencies. However, even after we control for the effect of these financial
and economic variables on delinquencies in our VAR model, the risk premium
differential remains an important variable for forecasting a change in delinquency
levels. This is the second distinguishing feature of our study.
u W h y A n a l y z e D i f f e r e n t i a l R i s k P r e m i u m ?
C o m p o n e n t s o f I n t e r e s t R a t e s
There are several underlying factors that influence the movement of interest rates.8
The first component is the nominal risk-free interest rate, which consists of the
real rate of interest and the expected inflation premium. The second component
is a market risk premium for risky assets that reflects uncertainty. Lenders require
additional interest to compensate for increased risk. A third component is the term
structure of interest rates. The longer the term of the loan, the higher the rate is
in general. The final component is the idiosyncratic risk premium, which is
specific to a particular investment, in the current study, hotel properties. Exhibit
1 shows the incremental interest rate components for hotels. The area at the bottom
represents the nominal interest rate on 10-year constant maturity Treasury bond,
which includes the real rate of interest and the inflation premium. Gilchrist,
Vladimir, and Zakrajsek (2009) argue that longer-maturity credit instruments such
as 10-year Treasuries are probably better at reflecting anticipated future economic
conditions one to two years ahead. The interest rate on office properties is higher
than yields on Treasuries of comparable maturities because of implicit default risk
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Exhibi t 1 u Incremental Interest Rate Components for Hotels
Sources: Federal Reserve, Cushman & Wakefield Sonnenblick Goldman, and Lehman Brothers.
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among other factors. The spread over Treasuries also reflects the systematic factors
that drive all real estate property types including the general real estate market
factor (risk premium), compensation for the general illiquidity of the commercial
real estate market, transaction costs, tax treatment, and other imperfections in the
commercial real estate market among others. In sum, the office risk premium can
be thought of as the risk adjustment that is systematic in nature, in addition to
the idiosyncratic risk associated with offices. The difference between hotel and
office interest rates is the idiosyncratic risk premium for hotels or the risk premium
differential (i.e., risk of hotels relative to office properties). This idiosyncratic risk
premium varies by approximately 58 basis points (0.584%) on average over the
course of our study.
S y m b i o t i c R e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n O f f i c e a n d H o t e l
P r o p e r t y Ty p e s
A question that arises is why the focus on the idiosyncratic risk premium for
hotels relative to office properties? What is so special about office properties?
Why not use some other property type, such as retail, which uses percentage
leases9 that give landlords a call option on the economy in good times and a base
rent in bad times. For one, several professional hotel advisory services such as
Cushman & Wakefield10 or HVS11 have found that a historical relationship exists
between occupied office space and room night demand, although this relationship
tends to vary by city. Consequently, occupied office space is a useful indicator of
anticipated room night demand. We estimate that approximately 0.42 room nights
are generated per year for every 1,000 square feet of occupied office space per
year on average.12 According to Fuller, Otten, and McKenna (2008), this
relationship exists since corporate travelers are one of the three major sources of
hotel demand.
With respect to hotel revenues, hotels generate revenues from several related
sources. Revenue comes from rooms (in the form of short-term leases), food and
beverage sales, and other secondary sources (such as rental of meeting space,
business center services, spa services, and recreational amenities such as golf,
tennis, and beach operations). To assess the relative importance of, and the degree
of variation in, various revenue sources we obtained data from PKF Hospitality
Research for our study period. These data are available on an annual frequency.
On average, for our time period, room revenues account for 67.06% of sales
(varying between a minimum of 64.60% and a maximum of 69.20%, a variation
of less than 5 2.5%), food and beverage sales account for an additional 25.63%
of sales (24.20% minimum and 26.70% maximum, a variation of less than
5 1.5%), and other sources of revenue account for the remaining 7.33% of sales
(5.90% minimum and 8.80% maximum, a variation of less than 5 1.5%). The
revenue breakdown for hotels is shown in Exhibit B1 of Appendix B. The
composition of revenues is relatively stationary over time, with revenue arising
from rooms, food and beverage, and other sources, each maintaining a constant
proportion to total revenues over the study period.13
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Another aspect that may be important in the hotel sector is property management.
With respect to our variable of interest—the credit spread—it may be reasonable
to expect that property management is an important determinant of the cost of
debt in a cross-section of hotel properties. However, since we focus on the time
series variation in the spread, the cross-sectional variation in management quality
is averaged out in our aggregated time series data. To assess the extent to which
the time series variation in management costs has an impact on hotel profitability,
we obtain data from PKF Hospitality Research on management cost as a
percentage of revenues. These data are reported on an annual frequency. The
management cost shows remarkably little variation and remains near the average
of 3.3% of revenues in our sample, as we illustrate in Appendix B (Exhibit B2).
The variation in management cost is unlikely to affect our results.
Another reason for choosing the office property type as a benchmark for
comparing hotels with respect to interest rate deals are lease characteristics, a
source of fixed time-invariant differences in interest rates (fixed effect14). Longer
leases characterize office properties, while a short-term 24-hour lease is typical
for hotels. Greater uncertainty of future cash flows is associated with short-term
leases, which in turn require a greater premium (higher borrowing cost) to
compensate for this risk. Sivitanidou and Sivitanides (1997) argue that differences
in lease length could also induce different income growth expectations. In
particular, smaller rental changes tend to correspond to longer leases, while a
shorter lease allows owners to take advantage of rent increases as the result of
improving market conditions. The short-term lease contract however also makes
hotels more prone to shocks arising from capital market factors (e.g., stock returns)
and the general economy. Exhibit 2 displays the risk premium differential plotted
with the difference in standard deviations of hotel and office returns. The
difference in standard deviations is positive, indicating that hotels have higher risk
than office properties.
Another related fixed effect to consider is adjustment costs or investment flexibility
(i.e., property that can be expanded or renovated). Typically hotels require higher
capital expenditures (also known as product improvement programs or PIPs in
hotel parlance) relative to offices given the higher tenant turnover, which is a
function of the length of the lease. Thus lenders may require a risk premium to
compensate for greater adjustment costs. Intuitively, the interest rate on the office
property type is analogous to a risky long-term straight bond with the interest rate
on hotels resembling a long term-straight bond plus an option.
S p r e a d s R e l a t i v e t o T r e a s u r y
A related question is why not focus on the difference between mortgage rates and
Treasury bond rates (e.g., Maris and Segal, 2002; Nothaft and Freund, 2003; and
Titman, Tompaidis, and Tsyplakov, 2005)? By looking at the differential in interest
rates between hotel and office property types, we already control for factors that
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Exhibi t 2 u The Risk in the Risk Premium: The Difference in Standard Deviations of Hotel and Office Returns
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systematically impact all property types to a similar extent, such as the general
real estate market (e.g., overall real estate risk premium), the capital market (e.g.,
credit spread of corporate bonds), and general economic conditions regardless of
whether they are observable or not. Consequently, we are better able to study traits
that elicit differential risk premium between property types. Working with
measures in terms of differentials is an important feature of our study.
u D a t a a n d M e t h o d o l o g y
The average spread for a property type over Treasury at the time of loan
origination (SATO) for mortgage loans for hotels and office property types is
obtained from Lehman Brothers for the period starting July 1998 through January
2008. We update the SATO data using Cushman Wakefield Sonnenblick-Goldman
survey of indicated spreads15 for conventional commercial mortgage loans over a
10-year Treasury bond beginning in February 2008 and ending in March 2011.
All data are monthly. This gives us a relatively long time series that encompasses
both the times of economic growth and the times of economic distress (recessions).
We therefore are able to study the informational content of the spread under a
variety of economic conditions. The Lehman data are normalized for loan size
and loan-to-value (LTV) to capture the true difference in SATO by property type,
while the Cushman data are normalized for loan size but not LTV.16 The Cushman
data are used since the Lehman data were discontinued with the collapse of
Lehman Brothers.17
Since we use data from two sources, Lehman Brothers (LB) in earlier periods up
to January 2008 and Cushman Wakefield Sonnenblick Goldman (CWSG) starting
from February 2008 onwards (given the collapse of Lehman and subsequent non-
reporting of SATO), a natural question that arises is to what extent the two series
are comparable and combining the two is reasonable. To ascertain the
comparability of the two series and to investigate the continuity of our data, we
collect quarterly interest rate and LTV data on office buildings and hotels from
the American Council of Life Insurance Companies (ACLI) publication
Commercial Mortgage Commitments—Historical Database.18 While the ACLI data
are reported at quarterly frequency and thus are not appropriate for our main
analysis, which we conduct at a monthly frequency, it is useful to assess our
combined data series. The correlation between ACLI interest rate for office and
our data for office is 0.88, and the correlation for ACLI data for hotels and our
hotel interest rate series is 0.81. This indicates that our overall data series is highly
correlated with the data series from one source (ACLI).
Wall Street analysts use SATO as a measure of default risk (e.g., default models
use loan-specific SATO as one of the key performance drivers). The intuition for
using SATO as a default metric is that the yield spreads (interest rate–risk-free
rate) for various property types include two options: default risk (put option) and
prepayment risk (call option). Prepayment risk for commercial mortgages is often
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minimized through ‘‘lock out’’ provisions or ‘‘yield maintenance’’ requirements,
which reduce the value of the call option while the value of the put option (default)
remains unchanged. We subtract the SATO corresponding to office from the SATO
for hotels to obtain the differential risk premium at time t (SATOHotel,t –SATOOffice,t).
The differential risk premium (incremental risk premium for hotels over and above
office properties, see Exhibit 1) is our variable of interest. A positive risk premium
differential suggests higher risk including greater default (delinquency) risk since
the hotel loan is made at a wider spread relative to an office loan.
The macroeconomic variables we examine include the percentage change or
growth rate in expected corporate earnings per share on the S&P 500 (PCTEPS),
the growth rate in total employment (EMPL), and the rate of unemployment
(UNEMPL).19 The growth rate in expected earnings per share is included since
they not only represent Wall Street’s consensus on the expected movements in the
economy but also partly reflect corporate management’s short-term expectations.20
Since most overnight stays are business related and corporations plan their travel
in advance, expected earnings are used as an anticipated demand instrument.21
Expected earnings should also reflect future disposable income growth; the leisure
demand market segment depends heavily on disposable income. Finally, news
about future corporate earnings could also reflect corporate borrowers’ shocks to
their ability to pay debt in the future. Our rationale for including expectation
variables is that if markets are efficient then credit spreads should reflect
expectations in addition to realizations. A capital market variable used is the
difference in the standard deviation of total returns on hotel REITs and office
REITs (DIFFSTDEV). The difference in the standard deviations is our proxy for
the additional riskiness in performance of hotel REITs over and above office
REITs that stock market participants anticipate over a 12-month period. Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) use the implied volatilities of near-the-
money options on the OEX (S&P 100) index to proxy for changes in a firm’s
future volatility in their study of credit spreads.22 Previous corporate bond studies
have often used stock returns to proxy for changes in a firm’s health. Similarly,
we use the volatility of REIT returns as a metric of the uncertainty about future
returns on a property type. Titman and Torous (1989) indirectly show that greater
variability of property values increases the likelihood of default in circumstances
where the unpaid loan amount exceeds property value. REIT returns are used given
the greater frequency (monthly) of values relative to underlying property values,
which are typically reported on a quarterly basis. In addition to this, REIT returns
contain market expectations (are forward looking) for a given property type in
contrast to underlying property values. The volatility of hotel REITs should exceed
office REIT volatility given the higher frequency of rent resetting of the former
due to shorter lease terms, ceteris paribus. Hotel property values should thus adjust
more quickly relative to office values, which are subject to existing contract rents
on longer-term leases. The real estate variable of interest is the incremental
delinquency rate for hotels relative to office properties (DELINQ). The incremental
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delinquency rate is a useful indicator of the volume of distress hotel loans
percolating. In sum, we study a system with several variables capturing the state
of the economy and the demand for hotel services. The variables include expected
earnings per share, the unemployment rate, and/or the growth rate in employment,
which are all metrics that influence either discretionary income or the perception
of financial security. Appendix A gives a description and source(s) of each of
these variables.
To analyze the information content of the incremental credit spread for hotels, as
well as the information contained in our macroeconomic variables measuring
activity in the economy as a whole, the capital markets, and the real estate markets,
we employ a vector autoregression (VAR) model. A VAR is a useful and flexible
way of analyzing economic relations in time series data. More specifically, the
VAR allows for the mutual impact of the variables; it is thus well suited for inter-
dependent economic time series. The technique is useful in examining complex
relationships among variables when the variables are serially correlated. Typically,
VARs have little serial correlation in the residuals. This is helpful for separating
out the effects of economically unrelated influences in the VAR. We use the VAR
model to reveal the evolution of the credit spread and the macroeconomic
variables, as well as the dynamic interactions between the variables.
u R e s u l t s
S t a g e 1 : E c o n o m i c D y n a m i c s o f t h e S p r e a d
Our initial point of departure is an analysis of the variation in the relative spread.
There is a substantial time series variation in the differential risk premium
(incremental risk premium for hotels over and above office properties) as seen in
Exhibit 1. What economic, market, and industry variables account for the time
series variation in the spread in a parsimonious model? This is an important
question for understanding loan pricing in the real estate market. Our variable of
interest is the relative cost of capital (spread) between the market with relatively
short leases and the market with longer leases. Understanding the behavior of the
spread will result in a better understanding of the connection between economic
and market conditions and relative pricing in real estate markets with different
effective lease durations. Our investigation proceeds in several steps, as we relate
the risk premium differential to factors that can account for the sources of variation
associated with a higher risk premium. We employ a sequential process to
determine whether the existing variables in our VAR system remain relatively
stationary and continue to forecast the spread, as well as to ascertain if our newly
introduced factors contribute to the spread forecast. We start by estimating a
simple VAR system that includes two variables, the risk premium differential and
the risk differential, as follows:
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L
RISKDIFF 5 a z RISKDIFFOt i t2i
i51
L
1 b z DIFFSTDEV 1 u . (1)O i t2i t
i51
L
DIFFSTDEV 5 d z RISKDIFFOt i t2i
i51
L
1 g z DIFFSTDEV 1 n . (2)O i t2i t
i51
We examine the impulse response functions (not shown for brevity) for this VAR
system. We find that an increase in risk differential forecasts an increase in the
risk premium differential. Therefore, the risk premium responds to risk. We also
find that a higher risk premium differential forecasts an increase in risk differential.
A feedback loop thus exists between the risk premium differential and the
differential risk metric. As a robustness check, we re-estimate the VAR by adding
a measure of economic conditions, unemployment (UNEMPL), to our financial
measure of the risk differential. The inclusion of the unemployment variable does
not change the previously reported results. We find that the differential in risks
and unemployment both have an important affect in the risk premium differential.
Having established the connection between the risk premium differential and
several economic variables in a simple setting, we now proceed to incorporate
more variables simultaneously in a parsimonious model.
We estimate a VAR system that includes five variables: (1) risk premium
differential (RISKDIFF); (2) a measure of corporate profitability—a percentage
change in the forward earnings per share (PCTEPS); (3) risk differential measured
as the difference in standard deviations (DIFFSTDEV); (4) unemployment rate
(UNEMPL); and (5) CMBS issuance as a proxy for capital supply conditions.23
Exhibit 3 shows the impulse response functions for the response in the risk
premium differential to a change in the magnitude of the variables in the system.
The results indicate that the risk premium differential is autoregressive (first row,
left graph), the risk premium differential falls when higher earnings are expected
(first row, right), an increase in risk results in a higher risk premium differential
(second row, left), and an increase in unemployment represents a deterioration in
economic conditions and forecasts an increase in the risk premium differential.24
We also find that a positive shock in CMBS issuance, indicating an inflow of
funds through a higher CMBS issuance and increasing capital availability, results
in a lower risk premium differential.
Next, we add two variables that measure the demand for hotel services into our
existing VAR system. The hotel industry variables are total hotel revenues
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Exhibi t 3 u Impulse Response Functions to a Cholesky One Standard Deviation Innovation
In Exhibit 3, we plot impulse response functions (IRFs) for the risk premium differential to a unit standard deviation
change in a particular variable, traced forward over a 12-month period. Response to Cholesky 1 standard
deviation. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence bands. The VAR system contains five variables: (1) risk premium
differential (RISKDIFF ); (2) a percentage change in forward earnings per share (PCTEPS); (3) risk differential
(DIFFSTDEV ); (4) unemployment rate (UNEMPL); and (5) CMBS issuance.
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(HOTREVYR) and total hotel demand (HOTDMNDYR). We also exclude two
existing variables, risk differential (DIFFSTDEV) and unemployment rate
(UNEMPL), from the system. The rationale is that DIFFSTDEV and UNEMPL
could contain the same information as a more direct measure of hotel industry
performance proxied by HOTREVYR and HOTDMNDYR. We will explore this
relationship more fully in a subsequent VAR impulse response function analysis.
The impulse response functions (IRFs) for this VAR system are shown in
Exhibit 4.
Exhibit 4 reveals that all of the existing variables in our previous VAR system
continue to behave in a similar manner. The risk premium differential series is
still autoregressive. The risk premium charged for hotel loans declines when
aggregate earnings environment is expected to improve and as funding becomes
available through CMBS issuance and capital supply increases.
There are also several new insights in Exhibit 4. The third graph in the first row
indicates that an increase in hotel revenues forecasts a drop in the risk premium
charged. The third row of Exhibit 4 shows the response of total hotel revenues
(HOTREVYR) to the variables in the system. The first graph indicates that a shock
to the risk premium differential does not forecast a change in total hotel revenues.
The second panel indicates that a shock to expected corporate profitability
(PCTEPS) forecasts an increase in hotel revenues. This is consistent with
economic intuition that hotel revenues are related to business activity. The third
panel in the third row captures the autoregressive nature of hotel revenues. The
fourth panel shows that hotel revenues are related to hotel demand, as expected.
The fourth row of Exhibit 4 shows the response of total hotel demand
(HOTDMDYR) to the variables in the system. The results are similar to the results
for total hotel revenues. In particular we find that risk premium differential does
not forecast total hotel demand; we find that forward EPS forecasts hotel demand.
The fifth row of Exhibit 4 shows the response of CMBS issuance to the variables
in the system. We find that our forward-looking corporate profitability measure
(PCTEPS) forecasts demand for hotel services (HOTREVYR and HOTDMNDYR).
We also find that the risk premium differential has no power to forecast the hotel
demand variables (HOTREVYR and HOTDMDYR).
We next examine the information content incorporated in DIFFSTDEV and
UNEMPL relative to HOTREVYR, a more direct metric of hotel industry
performance. The new VAR system includes not only the difference in standard
deviations (DIFFSTDEV) and unemployment (UNEMPL) as a measure of
economic conditions but also hotel revenues (HOTREVYR). Other variables
included in the system are the percentage change in forward EPS (PCTEPS),
activity in the hotel CMBS market (CMBSISSU), and our variable of interest, the
risk premium differential (RISKDIFF).
Plots of the IRFs associated with our new system are shown in Exhibit 5 for the
risk premium differential to a unit standard deviation change in a particular
variable in the system, traced forward over a 12-month period. This system
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Exhibi t 4 u Impulse Response Functions to a Choleskey One Standard Deviation Innovation
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Exhibi t 4 u (continued)
Impulse Response Functions to a Choleskey One Standard Deviation Innovation
In Exhibit 4, we plot impulse response functions (IRFs) to a unit standard deviation change in a particular variable, traced forward over a 12-month period. Response to
Cholesky 1 standard deviation. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence bands.
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Exhibi t 5 u Impulse Response Functions for the Risk Premium Differential
In Exhibit 5, we plot impulse response functions (IRFs) for the Risk Premium Differential to a unit standard deviation
change in a particular variable, traced forward over a period of 12 months. Response to Cholesky 1 standard
deviation. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence bands.
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captures the economic dynamics established through the previous analysis very
well. The results are consistent with our prior findings regarding the autoregressive
nature of the risk premium differential and the respective roles that improved
corporate profitability and increasing CMBS issuance play in lowering the risk
premium. The new insight of these plots is that when a direct measure of
conditions in the hotel market—hotel revenues (HOTREVYR)—is included in the
system, the significance of the other two risk variables declines. The risk
differential (DIFFSTDEV) and unemployment (UNEMPL) are no longer
significant at the 5% level (although they remain significant at the 10% level). In
other words, using a direct measure of industry performance, hotel revenues,
subsumes the informational role of the less direct measures (risk differential and
unemployment).
We also examine the IRFs for the risk differential (DIFFSTDEV) to a unit standard
deviation change in a particular variable (not shown for brevity). There are several
results of interest. An increase in expected profitability (forward earnings)
forecasts a decline in the risk differential. The risk differential picks up movements
in unemployment; an increase in unemployment forecasts an increase in the risk
differential. An increase in hotel revenues forecasts a significant decline in the
risk differential. Overall, the results indicate that the risk differential variable
contains both information on the economy (unemployment) and industry-specific
information. When a direct measure of industry performance (hotel revenues) is
included in the VAR system, it captures the role of less direct performance
measures. The analysis indicates that the risk differential variable also captures a
variety of state variables very well including information on overall economic
conditions (unemployment) and industry performance. Thus, the inclusion of the
risk differential variable represents a parsimonious way of reflecting information
that is important for modeling the variation in the spread.
In this section we study the dynamics of the spread. We find that the behavior of
the spread is consistent with economic intuition and we establish that the
differential risk premium is systematically priced. The spread responds to a set of
economic variables that contains a measure of financial risk (DIFFSTDEV), a
forward-looking measure of financial performance (PCTEPS), a measure of
overall economic conditions (unemployment, UNEMPL), a measure of capital
supply conditions in the industry (CMBSISSU), and industry-specific performance
information captured by hotel revenues (HOTREVYR). These variables thus
capture risk and return information embedded in the risk premium differential
(spread).
S t a g e 2 : I n f o r m a t i o n a l C o n t e n t o f t h e S p r e a d
To study the informational content of the pricing spread, we begin with univariate
analysis. In efficient capital markets, prices reflect market expectations of risk and
return. Markets anticipate future developments and adjust prices for risky assets
(the required rate of return on capital) when expected conditions change. In this
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environment, the risk premium differential may contain important information that
is useful for forecasting delinquencies and foreclosures.
We begin by adopting a flexible approach and estimating a VAR system with risk
premium differential (RISKDIFF) and delinquency (DELINQ) as endogenous
variables. In accordance with the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz
Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), we estimate the VAR system with two
lags. Impulse response functions (not reported for brevity) for this system indicate
that the risk premium differential does not increase in response to a shock in
delinquencies. In other words, past delinquencies do not forecast increases in the
interest rate differential. The impulse response function for the delinquencies
shows that a shock to the risk premium differential forecasts an increase in
delinquencies with a lag of approximately three months. These results are
consistent with efficient markets: market prices anticipate future deterioration in
cash flows, rather than respond to them with a lag. Our findings thus indicate that
the risk premium differential contains important information regarding future
relative levels in delinquencies.
We also report the results of the regression of the risk premium differential
(RISKDIFF) on the past level of relative delinquencies in the hotel and office
mortgage-backed securities (DELINQ). Lagged values of the dependent and
independent variables are included to control for serial correlation in the data:
RISKDIFF 5 0.042 1 0.930 z RISKDIFFt t21
(2.05)** (22.70)***
1 0.018 z DELINQ 2 0.019 z DELINQ . (3)t t21
(1.52) (21.63)
The Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.05. The variable of interest is DELINQt . The
regression coefficient for this variable is not significant. We also estimate this
regression with the lagged delinquency variable (we perform regressions with
DELINQt21, or DELINQt22). The results are similar. These results are consistent
with the results from the VAR.25
Next, we estimate the following regression:
DELINQ 5 20.404 1 1.67 z RISKDIFFt t22
(22.75)** (2.97)***
2 0.52 z RISKDIFF 1 0.92 z DELINQ . (4)t23 t21
(20.87) (37.96)***
The Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.66. The variable of interest is the lagged measure
of the risk premium differential (RISKDIFFt22); the other variables are included
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in the regression to control for serial correlation. The results suggest that the risk
premium differential is a predictor of the relative level of delinquencies. The
results of this regression are consistent with the results from the VAR. We find
that the risk premium differential contains important information for predicting
delinquencies. To check the robustness of the above result, we include more lags
and estimate the regression:
DELINQ 5 20.454 1 1.54 z RISKDIFFt t22
(23.02)** (2.79)***
2 1.67 z RISKDIFF 1 1.43 z RISKDIFFt23 t24
(22.23)** (2.43)**
1 1.08 z DELINQ 2 0.17 z DELINQ . (5)t21 t22
(12.98)*** (22.18)**
The Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.99. The variable of interest is the lagged measure
of the risk premium differential (RISKDIFFt22). The coefficient for this variable
is positive (1.54) and significant (t-stat. 5 2.79), confirming our results.
M u l t i v a r i a t e A n a l y s i s
Having established that the risk premium differential has predictive power for
delinquencies in a univariate setting, we now proceed with multivariate analysis.
Our goal is to explore inter-temporal associations between loan delinquencies,
economic and financial conditions, and the risk premium differential. We estimate
a VAR system with the following endogenous variables: risk premium differential
(RISKDIFF), risk differential measured as the difference in standard deviations
(DIFFSTDEV), a measure of corporate profitability—a percentage change in the
forward earnings per share (PCTEPS), unemployment rate (UNEMPL), and
delinquency (DELINQ). In accordance with the AIC and BIC, we estimate the
VAR system with two lags.26
We now examine the IRFs for this VAR system. The top row of graphs in Exhibit
6 shows the response of the risk premium differential to shocks in the state
variables. The first panel (top row, left graph) shows that a shock to the risk
differential forecasts a positive change to the risk premium differential: a higher
risk differential forecasts a higher incremental compensation for risk. The second
graph in the top row shows that a shock to forward expected EPS results in a
lower risk premium differential. This result is consistent with the view that during
relatively good times—higher earnings—the spreads narrow. The next panel
indicates that a shock to unemployment forecasts an increase in the risk premium
differential. The last figure in the top row shows the response of the risk premium
differential to a shock in relative delinquencies. The impulse response function
indicates that the risk premium differential does not increase in response to past
delinquencies.
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Exhibi t 6 u Impulse Response Functions for the Risk Premium Differential and Relative Delinquency Rate
In Exhibit 6, we plot impulse response functions (IRFs) for the risk premium differential (top row) and relative delinquency rate (second row) to a unit standard deviation change
in a particular variable, traced forward over a 12-month period. Response to Cholesky 1 standard deviation. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence bands. The variables
included in the VAR system are: the differential risk premium (RISKDIFF), difference in standard deviations (DIFSTDEV), unemployment rate (UNEMPL), percentage change in
forward earnings per share (PCTEPS), and relative delinquency rate (DELINQ).
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The second row of Exhibit 6 shows the IRFs for delinquencies as a response
variable. The first figure indicates that in a multivariate VAR system, a shock to
the risk premium differential forecasts an increase in delinquencies. This is our
main result. It shows that when the effect of other financial and economic variables
on delinquencies has already been taken into account in a system, the risk
premium differential remains an important variable forecasting a change in
delinquency levels. The next graph in the bottom row shows that an increase in
the risk differential forecasts an increase in delinquencies. This result provides a
connection between risk as measured by financial market variables and future
delinquencies. Another financial variable in the system is forward EPS. An
increase in forward EPS forecasts a decrease in delinquencies, albeit after a longer
lag. Finally, the last graph shows that a shock to unemployment forecasts an
increase in delinquencies.
Given our results in a VAR setting, we next perform multivariate time series
regressions. Results of the regressions are reported in Exhibit 7. Each column
represents a different regression specification. The dependent variable is the level
of delinquencies, DELINQt. Lagged values of the dependent variable and of the
independent variables are included in the regressions to control for serial
correlation in the data.
The first specification includes the following explanatory variables: risk
premium differential27 (RISKDIFFt26), difference in risk (DIFFSTDEVt24), and
unemployment (UNEMPLt28). Our findings are consistent with the VAR analysis.
First, we find that the risk premium differential is an important variable for
forecasting delinquencies. In the regressions, the risk premium differential
(RISKDIFFt26) has a positive coefficient (coeff. 5 1.146, t-stat. 5 2.01), indicating
that an increase in the risk premium spread forecasts an increase in delinquencies.
Second, we find that an increase in risk, as captured by the difference in standard
deviations (DIFFSTDEVt24), forecasts an increase in delinquencies. Third, we find
that worsening economic conditions, as captured by the unemployment variable,
predicts an increase in delinquencies.
The second specification in Table 1 differs from the first specification in two ways.
We study the difference in the risk variable with a longer lag (DIFFSTDEVt26)
and we use the percentage change in total employment (EMPLt29) instead of the
unemployment variable. The results of this specification are fully consistent with
the results from the first specification.
In the third specification (Exhibit 1, third column) we add a forward-looking
financial variable to the regression. We include the percentage change in forward
S&P 500 earnings per share. We find that this variable is not significant in
forecasting delinquencies, but the behavior of other predictors does not change
after we control for this forward-looking financial measure.28
Overall, the results of our time series regressions are fully consistent with the
results from VAR analysis and indicate that the differential risk premium for hotels
is an important variable for forecasting hotel delinquencies.
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Exhibi t 7 u Regressions of Delinquency Rate
DELINQ (t ) DELINQ (t ) DELINQ (t ) DELINQ (t )
Intercept 20.728 0.158 20.729 0.126
(22.35)** (0.92) (22.32)** (0.69)
DELINQ (t21) 0.899 0.892 0.894 0.879
(10.49)*** (9.98)*** (10.23)*** (9.58)***
DELINQ (t22) 20.084 0.010 20.080 0.010
(20.99) (0.12) (20.93) (0.12)
RISKDIFF (26)a 1.146 0.966 1.186 0.997
(2.01)** (1.74)* (2.05)** (1.76)*
RISKDIFF (27) 20.481 20.301 20.448 20.199
(20.65) (20.41) (20.59) (20.27)
RISKDIFF (28) 20.707 20.476 20.761 20.507
(21.22) (20.82) (21.26) (20.84)
DIFFSTDEV (24)a 0.075 0.072
(1.68)* (1.60)
DIFFSTDEV (25) 20.088 20.088
(21.48) (21.45)
DIFFSTDEV (26) 0.127 0.129
(2.75)*** (2.74)***
DIFFSTDEV (26)a 0.138 0.133
(2.98)*** (2.80)***
DIFFSTDEV (27) 0.007 0.010
(0.11) (0.16)
DIFFSTDEV (28) 20.106 20.104
(22.28)** (22.17)**
UNEMPL (28)a 0.707 0.700
(1.94)** (1.85)**
UNEMPL (29) 20.100 20.089
(20.19) (20.17)
UNEMPL (210) 20.423 20.429
(21.12) (21.09)
EMPL (29)a 298.65 2101.52
(21.89)** (21.88)**
EMPL (210) 212.78 27.43
(20.23) (20.13)
EMPL (211) 227.50 234.90
(20.44) (20.54)
PCTEPS (22)a 1.081 1.611
(0.50) (0.76)
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Exhibi t 7 u (continued)
Regressions of Delinquency Rate
DELINQ (t ) DELINQ (t ) DELINQ (t ) DELINQ (t )
PCTEPS (23) 20.270 0.295
(20.13) (0.14)
PCTEPS (24) 20.576 20.168
(20.27) (20.08)
Durbin-Watson 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89
Notes: The table shows time series regressions of relative delinquency rate, DELINQ, on several
predictors: the differential risk premium (RISKDIFF ), difference in standard deviations (DIFSTDEV ),
unemployment rate (UNEMPL), percentage change (growth rate) in total employment (EMPL), and
percentage change in forward earnings per share (PCTEPS). Lagged values of the dependent and
independent variables are included to control for serial correlation the data. t -statistics are shown
in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
a Variable of interest.
*Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
***Significant at the 1% level.
u C o n c l u s i o n
We use a two-stage process to investigate how the length of the lease contract
affects the pricing of loan risk. Shorter-term leases such as those associated with
hotels (a room for a night) should exhibit a greater sensitivity to changes in
fundamental factors, which in turn should increase the loan pricing of risk (higher
interest rates) on this property type relative to longer-term leases associated with
other property types, such as office real estate where the rents are fixed over a
longer time horizon say five to ten years (e.g., these leases cannot be marked to
market instantaneously). We identify a parsimonious set of factors that affect the
spread. Using a VAR framework, we examine the dynamics of the incremental
hotel risk premium (hotel interest rate–office interest rate) to assess the extent to
which fundamental factors are incorporated into the loan pricing of hotels. These
factors include the state of the economy, expected corporate profitability, as well
as capital market and real estate market conditions.
Next, we examine the signaling implications associated with a widening or
tightening of the incremental hotel risk premium. We find that the differential risk
premium for hotels is systematically priced. This is our primary contribution. In
particular, a deterioration of general economic conditions, a decline in expected
corporate profitability, a reduction in capital availability, and/or a decrease in the
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demand for hotel services are catalysts resulting in a rise in the hotel risk premium
differential. We also show that changes in the risk differential and unemployment
incorporate information on the direction of hotel revenues, a direct measure of
industry performance. Overall, the finding that interest rates are higher when
lenders anticipate greater economic uncertainty provides evidence that lenders
price relative risk in the market where underlying properties (hotels) have
particularly short-term leases.
In addition to this, we demonstrate that the relative risk premium of hotel rates
above office property rates contains relevant information for forecasting hotel
delinquencies. However, the converse situation does not hold (e.g., the risk
premium differential does not increase in response to a shock in delinquencies).
While we do not imply causality, changes in the relative spread do have additional
forecasting ability (after accounting for other variables) with respect to relative
delinquencies. Hotel credit spreads widen when lenders anticipate higher hotel
delinquencies and narrow during expected hotel prosperity. We also find that an
increase in the volatility of hotel REIT returns or risk (as measured by standard
deviation of returns) and a change in economic conditions as captured by
unemployment have forecasting power for hotel delinquencies and foreclosures.
More importantly, even after we control for the effect of other financial and
economic variables on delinquencies in our VAR model, the risk premium
differential remains an important variable for forecasting a change in delinquency
levels. This is our main result in the second stage.
u A p p e n d i x A
Variable Description and Source of Data
Delinquency Rate (DELINQ) Percentage of loans 301 days delinquent or in foreclosure for
hotels minus the percentage of loans 301 days delinquent or
in foreclosure for offices. Source: Trepp.
Difference in Standard
Deviation (DIFFSTDEV )
The difference in the standard deviation of total returns on
hotel real estate investment trusts (REITs) and office REITs. To
calculate the standard deviation for each property type a
rolling 12-month window is used on the total return series for a
given REIT property type. DIFFSTDEV 5 sHotel –sOffice. Source:
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts.29
Differential Risk Premium
(RISKDIFF )
Difference in the spread at time of origination (SATO) between
hotel and office property types; additional risk premium
associated with hotel. Source: Lehman Brothers, Cushman &
Wakefield (http://www2.cushwake.com/sonngold/ ).
Percentage Change (Growth
Rate) in Total Employment
(EMPL)
Percentage change in the number of employed persons from
period to period. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (via
http://www.economy.com/freelunch).
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Variable Description and Source of Data
Percentage Change in
Forward Earnings per
Share (PCTEPS )
PctEPS 5 (EEPSt /EEPSt21) 2 1. Where EEPS is forward
earnings per share, analysts’ estimates of earnings per share
for the S&P 500. This is anticipated profits in contrast to actual
corporate profits (see corporate profits (PROFITS ). Source: http:
//www.yardeni.com.
Unemployment Rate
(UNEMPL)
Number of unemployed persons divided by the labor force,
where the labor force is the number of unemployed persons
plus the number of employed persons. Source: U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics (via http://www.economy.com/freelunch).
Hotel Revenues Year-over-
Year (HOTREVYR)
Year-over-year percentage change in total hotel revenues (all
hotel classes). Source: STR Global.
Hotel Demand Year-over-
Year (HOTDMDYR)
Year-over-year percentage change in total hotel demand (all
hotel classes). Source: STR Global.
CMBS Issuance Trailing 12
Months (CMBSISSU )
Trailing 12 months CMBS issuance. Source: CRE Finance
Council, Compendium of Statistics30 (original source of data is
Commercial Mortgage Alert).
TERM Term spread. The difference between the yield on a 10-year
Treasury bond and the yield on a 3-month Treasury bill.
Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve.
u A p p e n d i x B
Exhibi t B1 u Revenue Breakdown in Hotels
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Exhibi t B2 u Management Fee as a Percentage of Total Revenues in Hotels
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u E n d n o t e s
1 For example, Morgan and Ashcraft (2003) find that interest rate spreads on loans are
very good predictors of future loan performance (loan default risk) and rating
downgrades for banks. In other words, interest rate spreads are good forward-looking
measures of risk. As a result of their findings, the authors propose that regulators should
consider basing capital requirements on loan interest.
2 Prior studies on credit spreads have focused on one of three issues: (1) the relation
between the risk-free rate or its term structure and the credit spread; (2) the credit spread
puzzle arising from the fact that the default risk is not as variable as the credit spread
over time; and (3) do asset prices correctly reflect and in turn are impacted by
fundamental economic factors. We focus on the latter issue in the current study.
3 If two time series make relatively slow movements through time (a common feature for
economic data), then a long time series (spanning many years) is needed before the true
joint tendencies of the two variables can be measured reliably. Shiller (1989) stresses
the argument that obtaining many observations by sampling frequently (say, through
weekly or even daily observations) does not appreciably increase the power to measure
the joint relationship between the two time series if the data span a total of only a few
years.
4 See also Li, Mooradian, and Yang (2009) and Chiang (2010).
5 For a recent discussion of the importance of understanding real estate debt performance
and delinquencies see, for example, Igan and Pinheiro (2010).
6 Titman, Tompaidis, and Tsyplakov (2005) investigate what are the determinants of credit
spreads for commercial mortgages. Credit spreads are defined as differences between
mortgage rates and Treasury bond rates with the same maturities.
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7 Understanding variables that help predict loan performance is of broad interest to
researchers and practitioners (Ding, Quercia, Li, and Ratcliffe, 2011).
8 See Liu and Quan (2010) for a general discussion of factors driving the hotel investment
discount rate.
9 A percentage lease is a lease whose rental is based on a percentage of the monthly or
annual gross sales made on the premises. Common types of percentage leases include
a fixed minimum rent plus a percentage of the gross, a fixed minimum rent against a
percentage of the gross, whichever is greater; and a fixed minimum rent plus a
percentage of the gross, with a ceiling to the percentage rental among others.
10 For example, Cushman and Wakefield (2008) found that for Washington, D.C.
approximately 263 room nights are generated per year on average for every 1,000 square
feet of occupied office space per year.
11 HVS finds that a strong correlation also exists between office supply and hotel supply.
12 We use CoStar data from Smith Travel Research on occupied office space (square feet)
and occupied hotel rooms to estimate quarterly ratio of occupied hotel rooms per 1,000
square feet of occupied office space for the 2007–2011 period. The average ratio is 0.42.
The correlation between occupied office space and occupied hotel rooms is 0.98.
13 See Gallagher and Mansour (2000) for a study of hotel real estate market.
14 See Sivitanidou and Sivitanides (1997) for a more complete discussion of some of the
potential fixed effects.
15 According to Christopher Moyer at Cushman & Wakefield, the rate ranges are based on
general rate indications from lenders for those asset classes, recent quotes, and closed
transactions.
16 Prior studies have also used SATO data that have not been normalized. For example,
the ACLI data on loan commitments made by life insurers that Nothaft and Freund
(2003) use in their study are also not standardized for changes in terms and maturities.
We do not use the ACLI data in the current study since it is quarterly while the Cushman
and Wakefield data are monthly. In addition, hotel loans are not necessarily made in
each quarter by insurance companies. However, we do use the ACLI data to assess our
combined data series (which we first convert to a quarterly series). Our overall data
series for both office buildings and hotels is highly correlated with the data series from
one source (ACLI). To account for possible LTV differences for the Cushman and
Wakefield data, we also estimate all VARs and regressions with a control for LTV
differences added to the models. The results (not reported for brevity) remain the same.
17 To account for the fact that our data use series from both Lehman Brothers and Cushman
Wakefield Sonnenblick-Goldman, in addition to the results reported in the paper, we
also estimate all VARs and regressions in models that include a shift variable to account
for change in the data. The results (not reported for brevity) remain the same.
18 In the few quarters where the interest rate information is not available for hotels, we
use data from Trepp. We thank Jack Pong of Trepp for providing these data.
19 Prior research indicates a connection between real estate returns and the macroeconomy
[see Yunus (2012) for a recent study, and references therein]. We focus on the role of
macroeconomic conditions in setting relative cost of capital. In equilibrium there is a
direct link between cost of capital and returns.
20 Analysts typically form their expectations of earnings per share after conference calls
with a firm’s management and the announcement by management of forward-looking
earnings.
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Exhibi t 8 u Time Series Regressions of Delinquency Rate
DELINQ (t ) DELINQ (t ) DELINQ (t ) DELINQ (t )
Intercept 21.166 0.179 21.368 0.124
(22.86)*** (0.99) (23.00)*** (0.62)
DELINQ (t21) 0.887 0.886 0.881 0.870
(10.04)*** (9.56)*** (9.84)*** (9.15)***
DELINQ (t22) 20.091 0.014 20.083 0.010
(21.05) (0.15) (20.95) (0.11)
RISKDIFF (26)a 1.362 0.917 1.463 0.955
(2.25)** (1.73)* (2.37)** (1.73)*
RISKDIFF (27) 20.621 20.225 20.736 20.117
(20.83) (20.30) (20.96) (20.15)
RISKDIFF (28) 20.667 20.404 20.954 20.394
(21.08) (20.66) (21.43) (20.61)
DIFFSTDEV (24)a 0.077 0.082
(1.74)* (1.80)*
DIFFSTDEV (25) 20.097 20.094
(21.62) (21.55)
DIFFSTDEV (26) 0.129 0.127
(2.76)*** (2.69)***
DIFFSTDEV (26)a 0.139 0.133
(2.90)*** (2.72)***
DIFFSTDEV (27) 0.013 0.015
(0.20) (0.24)
DIFFSTDEV (28) 20.107 20.101
(22.23)** (22.02)**
UNEMPL (28)a 0.883 0.888
(2.20)** (2.19)**
UNEMPL (29) 20.057 20.042
(20.11) (20.08)
UNEMPL (210) 20.533 20.476
(21.35) (21.18)
EMPL (29)a 2101.33 2104.20
(21.89)* (21.88)*
EMPL (210) 220.44 214.45
(20.35) (20.24)
EMPL (211) 231.43 237.04
(20.49) (20.56)
PCTEPS (22)a 20.489 1.830
(20.21) (0.83)
PCTEPS (23) 22.015 0.536
(20.84) (0.24)
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Exhibi t 8 u (continued)
Time Series Regressions of Delinquency Rate
DELINQ (t ) DELINQ (t ) DELINQ (t ) DELINQ (t )
PCTEPS (24) 22.120 0.009
(20.92) (0.00)
TERM (25)a 0.199 20.031 0.206 20.021
(0.90) (20.14) (0.93) (20.09)
TERM (26) 20.216 20.146 20.187 20.153
(20.63) (20.43) (20.54) (20.44)
TERM (27) 20.047 0.126 20.086 0.115
(20.21) (0.58) (20.37) (0.52)
SHIFT 20.281 0.024 20.459 0.061
(21.39) (0.16) (21.71)* (0.38)
Durbin-Watson 1.93 1.89 1.91 1.89
Notes: The table shows time series regressions of relative delinquency rate, DELINQ, on several
predictors: the differential risk premium (RISKDIFF ), difference in standard deviations (DIFSTDEV ),
unemployment rate (UNEMPL), percentage change (growth rate) in total employment (EMPL),
percentage change in forward earnings per share (PCTEPS), and term spread (TERM). The SHIFT
variable captures the shift in the data from Lehman to Cushman Wakefield Sonnenblick-Goldman.
Lagged values of the dependent and independent variables are included to control for serial
correlation the data. t -statistics are shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
a Variable of interest.
*Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
***Significant at the 1% level.
21 Wheaton and Rossoff (1998) use GDP as their primary demand instrument. We do not
use GDP in our study since it is not forward looking. Besides this, GDP is published
quarterly and revised monthly.
22 The authors use noncallable, non-puttble debt of industrial firms in contrast to our study
wherein mortgages contain both a call and a put option. Further, the finding by DeLisle,
Price, and Sirmans (2013) that systematic volatility is not priced in the cross-section of
equity REIT returns, but idiosyncratic volatility is priced, warrants our investigation of
the role of standard deviation.
23 Availability of capital through the CMBS market may impact lending rates (Nothaft and
Freund, 2003).
24 To check the robustness of our results to the unemployment shock, we estimate the same
system but replace the unemployment variable with the employment variable (percentage
change in total employment). We find that our results are robust to this change. We also
perform another set of robustness checks for all VARs reported in the paper. To account
for variation in the term structure, we include a term spread—the difference between
1 6 6 u d e R o o s , L i u , Q u a n , a n d U k h o v
the yield on a 10-year Treasury and the yield on a 3-month Treasury—in all estimated
VARs. The results and conclusions (not reported for brevity) remain unchanged.
25 To account for the fact that our data uses series from both Lehman Brothers and
Cushman Wakefield Sonnenblick-Goldman, we also estimate the three regressions
reported in this section and all regressions reported in Exhibit 7 in a model that includes
a shift variable. The results (not reported for brevity) remain the same.
26 We use our full sample of monthly data from July 1998 through March 2011 to estimate
the system. We also estimate the system with a term spread, which is an endogenous
variable to account for the variation in the term structure; the results (not reported for
brevity) are unchanged from the results discussed in this section.
27 The lag structure for the explanatory variables is suggested by the results of the VAR
analysis, after considering the significance levels in the impulse response functions.
28 Exhibit 8 reports estimates for the same models as in Exhibit 7, but with the term spread
variable added to account for variation in the term structure, and a shift variable added
to account for the shift in the data from Lehman Brothers to Cushman Wakefield
Sonnenblick-Goldman. The results are unchanged from those reported in Exhibit 7.
29 http: / /www.reit.com/IndustryDataPerformance/IndustryDataPerformance.aspx.
30 http: / /www.crefc.org/uploadedFiles/CMSA Site Home/Industry Resources/
Research/Industry Statistics /CMSA Compendium.pdf.
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